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ABSTRACT 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) is the integration of 
computation and physical systems that make a 
complete system such as the network, software, 
embedded systems, and physical components. Major 
industries such as industrial plants, transport, 
national grid, and communication systems depend 
heavily on CPS for financial and economic growth. 
However, these components may have inherent 
threats and vulnerabilities on them that may run the 
risk of being attacked, manipulated or exploited by 
cyber attackers and commit cybercrimes. 
Cybercriminals in their quest to bring down these 
systems may cause disruption of services either for 
fame, data theft, revenge, political motive, economic 
war, cyber terrorism, and cyberwar. Therefore, 
identifying the risks has become imperative in 
mitigating the cybercrimes.  This paper seeks to 
identify cybercrimes and risks that are associated 
with a smart grid business application system to 
determine the motives and intents of the 
cybercriminal. The paper identified four goals to 
mitigate the risks: as business value, organizational 
requirements, threat agent and impact vectors. We 
used the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to 
determine the importance of the goals that 
contribute to identifying cybercrime and risks in 
CPS.  For the results, a case study is used to identify 
the threat and vulnerable spots and the prioritized 
goals are then used to assess the risks using a semi-
quantitative approach to determine the net threat 
level. The results indicate that using the AHP 
approach to identify cybercrime and risk on CPS 
provides specific risk mitigation goals.  
KEYWORDS: Cyber Physical System, 
Cybercrime, Risk Mitigation, Smart Grid, Cyber 
Security, Analytical Hierarchical Process.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
CPS infrastructures and applications have 
brought economic, business and societal impact 
benefits nationally and globally in the areas of 
Transport, Energy, Healthcare, Manufacturing, 
and Communication. CPS is the integration and 
configuration of computation, network and 
physical processing systems that are embedded 
together and uses computers, sensors, actuators, 
and network monitors to control processes [1]. 
CPS technology integrates the dynamics of 
analysis and design, modeling, abstractions of 
physical processes with those of the software, 
hardware and network topologies and provides 
a (smart grid) system infrastructure. 
Cybercrimes are the actual crimes committed 
using computers and the internet to manipulate, 
delete, alter, redirect or compromise and the 
exploitations that are carried out including 
advanced persistent threats. They are more of 
the consequences and effects of cyber attacks 
and they include data theft, industrial espionage, 
intellectual property theft, ID theft, and DoS. 
Cyberattack is the physical attacks that are 
initiated against the CPS through remote 
penetration, brute force, spear phishing, and 
hacking and SQL injection attacks. The attack 
media include Remote Access Trojan (RAT), 
rootkit, botnet, cross-site scripting, session 
hijacking, IP spoofing, redirect script, spyware, 
ransomware, and others. Cyber attacks are 
carried out through many different forms of 
threat agent such as Trojans, viruses, botnets, 
spyware, and worms which are instrumental in 
facilitating certain cybercrimes. Cybercrime can 
be initiated from anywhere in the world on 
Network Control Systems (NCS) and 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems [2]. CPS are autonomous 
systems that make a decision in real time using 
agents and requires real-time availability of 
information.   
CPS implementation has inherent 
challenges and vulnerabilities embedded in 
them due to the evolving organizational 
processes and the changing threat landscapes. 
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This has led to many problems such as poor 
requirements capturing, software errors, and 
misconfiguration and lack of risk assessments. 
These implementation challenges and 
vulnerabilities may run the risk of being 
exploited by cybercriminals in their quest to 
bring down the systems and cause disruption of 
services for fame, revenge, political motive, 
economic war, cyber espionage, cyber 
terrorism, and cyberwar. There have been recent 
cybercrimes such as Stuxnet attack [2] and 
Duqu malware [3]. Ukraine Power plant [4], 
Ransomware attacks on UK NHS [5] [6], Saudi 
Aramco power plant attack [7]. These 
cybercrimes have impacted greatly on the 
organizational business process and had had a 
socio-economic impact on these nation states. 
These perpetrators can cause zero-day attacks, 
evil maid attack, Denial of service attack, 
resonance attacks, and spyware, ransomware, 
spoofing, rootkit, and botnet attacks. Most 
organization integrates their systems with 
SMEs, suppliers, and distributors for business 
processes and service deliveries on a supply 
chain environment. However, most of the 
systems that these systems are not properly 
secured.  
There are existing works that have 
looked at cybercrime and CPS risks, threats, 
vulnerabilities and attacks such as Nicol et al 
2016 [8], Cardenas et al 2011 [9], Humayed et 
al 2017 [10], Wand & Lu 2013 [11], Sun et al 
2018 [12], and Anderson et al. 2012 [13]. 
However, gaps exist such as poor requirements 
capturing that leads to misconfigurations 
especially on software that is bought off the 
shelf. Which also impacts on the network 
infrastructures that integrates with the cyber 
digital system.  Also, none of the authors 
considered cybercrime and risk from evolving 
organizational threat landscape using the 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) [14]. 
This paper seeks to identify cybercrimes and 
risks that are associated with a smart grid 
business application system to determine the 
motives and intents of the cybercriminal. The 
paper considers business value, organizational 
requirements, and threat agent and impact 
vectors as the mitigation goals. The paper looks 
at the cybercrime and risk for CPS, and not 
cyber attacks. The main contributions of this 
paper are threefold: first, we identify threats and 
attacks that have the potential to cause 
cybercrime risk. We integrate concepts from 
CPS risk assessments, frameworks, standards, 
and controls required to understand the 
attacker’s motives and intents. Secondly, we use 
the AHP method to determine the net risk levels 
on the organizational asset and pairwise 
comparisons for decision making in identifying 
the risks. We used the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). [14], [15] to determine the 
importance of the goals. Finally, we used a 
semi-quantitative approach to determine the net 
threat level. The reason being that not 
considering the risk assessment will prevent the 
organization from achieving the goal. CPS 
platforms provide organizations the abilities run 
their businesses goals or objectives with third 
party systems cybercrime risk may prevent that.  
A case study is used to evaluate the comparative 
importance of the goals and equate the results. 
The results show that using the AHP approach 
to identify cybercrime and risk on CPS, provides 
specific risk mitigation goals.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: 
section 1 looks at the background of CPS risk 
and cybercrime.  Section 2 outlines the state of 
the art, an overview of CPS, attacks, risk, 
cybercrime. Section 3 looks at the methodology 
and study approach. Section 4: Implementation 
of the risk mitigation process and results. 
Section 5 discusses the risk mitigations goals, 
relative importance, net results, risk 
management, and limitations. Section 6 presents 
the conclusions and future works.  
  
2 RELATED WORKS 
This section reviews the papers and related 
works done for the state of the art that provides 
concepts to understand the recent trend of 
cybercrime and risks on CPS smart grid from 
organization context. For the paper, we define 
cybercrime, then review the start of the art of 
CPS attacks, threats, vulnerabilities and risks. 
Risk and Controls in CPS. Standards and 
Controls.  
2.1 Cybercrimes 
Cybercrime is any crime committed using 
computers, and the internet. Gordon & Ford 
2006, [16], Shodhganga 2007 [17], posits that it 
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is only a cybercrime if the internet places a 
central role and not an incidental one.   
However, the Council of Europe defines 
cybercrime as offenses ranging from criminal 
activity against data to content and copyright 
infringement CoE 2001, [18]. Zappa 2014, 
defines cybercrime as a set of illegal operations 
that takes place on the internet [19].  UNODC 
2013 defines cybercrime as the misuse of 
information resources and or the impact on them 
in the informational sphere for illegal purposes 
[20]. Trojans, Viruses, Bots, Spyware, and 
Worms, are instrumental in facilitating certain 
cybercrimes.  
2.2 CPS, Infrastructure, Attacks, Threats, 
Vulnerabilities and Risk 
In this section, we look at the overview of CPS 
and consider the concepts of CPS attacks, 
threats, vulnerabilities and risk management 
framework 
2.2.1 CPS Smart Grid Infrastructure 
CPS is an integration of the computation and 
physical process that makes a complete system 
[9]. CPS smart grid uses renewable energy 
resource distribution in an efficient and reliable 
way to provide demand and response 
intelligence [10]. The infrastructure comprises 
of the application system and network system. 
The applications integrate Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
Programmable Logic Controls (PLC), Sensors, 
Actuators and other communication networks 
for electric power generation, distribution, and 
transmission [21]. SCADA system uses remote 
telemetric units (RTUs) and (PLCs) to monitor 
equipment across various substations, gather 
data in real time from the various sources and 
ensure proper control of network servers for 
business processes including input and output 
analyses [22]. The network application provides 
interfaces, interconnectivity and programmable 
logic required for implementing automation 
processes for the field devices and Home 
Energy Management Systems (HEMS) 
software. [23] [24]. We consider concepts from 
IEC 61850 and develop a diagram that 
integrates the electric power distribution 
systems.  
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Figure 1. Proposed Smart Grid System 
Infrastructure 
The supporting infrastructures include the 
integrations of intelligent devices that use 
various hardware and software components as 
well as communications networks to provide 
monitoring and controlling of the core business 
operations and processes for the energy 
management system [10] [24] [25]. According 
to IEC 61850, the smart grid uses Modbus and 
DNP3 network for field devices and advance 
protocols [27]. The control centers 
communicate with the field devices at various 
substations through wireless network protocols 
such as Inter Control Centre Protocols (ICCP) 
and TCP/IP.  
2.3 Cyber Physical Systems Attacks 
CPS attacks are those cyber attacks that include 
DDoS, Spyware and Ransomware attacks that 
could lead to various cybercrimes on the system 
such as industrial espionage and ID theft, data 
theft and data manipulations after gaining access 
to the system resources.  CPSs have been at the 
core of national and international critical 
infrastructure and major industrial systems [2]. 
The increasing dependency on CPS has brought 
about the increased cybercrime attacks as these 
control systems become the backbone of every 
economy. There are various attack scenarios 
that can be initiated on CPS that could cause a 
zero-day attack. An attacker could insert 
malware or spyware into the software to exploit 
an unpatched vulnerable spot that is usually 
unknown to the vendor who bought the software 
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off the shell. The following are a few attacks that 
could be initiated:  
2.3.1 Evil Maid Attack 
 
An evil-maid attack is a security exploit that 
targets a computing device that has been left 
unattended or shut down. Here the evil maid 
who is mostly internal staff (a Corporate Spy) or 
(Industrial Espionage) attacker could boot the 
system with a boot loader or USB drive, installs 
a key logger and then captures encryption keys 
then uses it to steal data.  
 
2.3.2 Resonance Attack 
 
Resonance Attack is an attack that the 
perpetrator compromises some sensors or 
controllers that forces the physical system to 
oscillate at its resonant frequency. For instances, 
exploiting the zero-day attack vulnerability and 
then compromise the real timer systems and 
prevent the actuators from picking up the correct 
signals from the sensors thereby providing 
wrong information.  
 
2.3.3 Denial of Service Attack (DoS)  
 
DoS attack is a cyber-attack that the perpetrator 
interrupts the network in an unauthorized 
manner, disrupts services and denies authorized 
users from having access to the network 
resource affecting the control systems 
performance, especially in a distributed system. 
On a Wireless Network Control Systems, a 
perpetrator could cause optimal jamming attack 
which maximizes the linear quadratic Gaussian 
control in plants to affect the control system 
performance [28].  
 
2.3.4 Malware Attack 
 
Malware is a software program that propagates 
a network system and exploits vulnerable spots 
such as virus and Trojans. A malware attack 
‘Stuxnet’ [2] was designed to target five Iranian 
Critical Infrastructures an Organizations 
suspected to be Uranium enrichment 
Infrastructures. The worm initially spreads 
discriminately, and have a highly sophisticated 
malware payload designed to target Siemens 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems configured to control and 
monitor specific industrial processes. Malware 
such as a random access Trojan attack the 
victims CPS remotely, hide and install itself as 
a payload without the victim’s knowledge and 
obfuscate. 
 
2.3.5 Ransomware  
 
A malicious software virus designed to stop a 
system from functioning completely by 
encrypting the data and sending a message to the 
owner to pay a ransom amount before the data 
will be released.  Consequences are that they 
cause financial loss, puts human health at risk 
and industrial sabotage Wanna cry attack [5]. 
Infected 230,000 computers in over 150 
countries with NHS, Spanish Phone Company 
Telefonica, German State Railways and others. 
[6], Petya ransomware spread rapidly through 
network systems that use MS windows 
operating systems infected and subverts the 
Programmable Logic Control (PLC) on the 
industrial systems. [5]. 
 
2.4 Cyber Physical System Threats 
A threat is anything that has the potential to 
cause harm and securing CPS from threats 
comes with its own challenges. Here we identify 
the threats that have the potential to cause 
general threats and then look at specific threats 
to CPS. Potential threats may cause a lot of 
damage and disruptions to the systems, and loss 
of data to organizations [9]. We identify five 
potential sources that a perpetrator can pose a 
threat. These are the source, target, motive, 
attack vectors, and potential consequences [10]. 
Threat source falls in three categories:  
1. Social engineering is a threat that attackers us 
to deceive victims to release private 
information. The use that to cause DoS attack, 
panic, fear, and chaos.  
 Unexpected threat or accidental threat, are 
threats that happen accidentally or through 
legitimate CPS components such as network 
system faults that lead to failures and down 
times. 
 Target: Application components or users 
such as servers, network, and sensors. 
1. Motives: A reason to launch an attack. 
Attacker’s motives are revenge, economic, 
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political, create terror and panic, or 
cyberwar. 
2. Attack vector: Attack method and 
trajectories used to deploy attacks successful 
such as interception, interruption, 
modification, and fabrication. 
3. Consequences: Impact of the damage caused 
by the compromise of the CPS security triad 
confidentiality, Integrity, and availability, 
reputation, cyber industrial espionage. 
2.4.1 CPS Threats Motives  
 
The motives and intents of the cybercriminal 
determine the nature of an attack. To be able to 
ensure that CPS risks are assessed for proper 
mitigation, we look at attacks on CPS 
applications and methods that are specific to 
attacker’s motivation, intentions, sources used, 
target, vector, and the impact.  
 APT Hacker: attackers (motive) is to cause 
APT attack: Attacker carries out 
reconnaissance to identify (vulnerable spot) 
and penetrate the system and exploit the 
wireless capabilities (vector) and manipulate, 
control and disrupt operations (impact).  
 Financially Motivated (Motive): Could be 
internal and uses social engineering or 
external remote attack (vulnerable spots) aim 
is to reduce utility bill and tariff, or divert 
money, hack into the system or inject false 
data (vector) cause system to record wrong 
utility data (target) and cause financial loss 
(impact).  
 Politically Motivated: Passive espionage 
attack. The attacker uses spyware to gather 
intelligence remotely (vulnerable spots) carry 
out reconnaissance on targeted nation’s 
critical infrastructures (target) and initiate 
malware (vector) to steal confidentiality 
information (impact).   
 Cyberwarfare: military power (motive) 
initiated an attack from a nation (vulnerable 
spots) to cyberwar against another nation 
(target) by remotely attacking its critical 
infrastructures e.g., national grid or access 
field devices (vector) leading to power shut 
down sabotage, or economic loss (impact).   
 Physical System Attack:  (motive) on power 
plants or cause cyber terrorism: an attacker 
identifies (vulnerable spot) on CPS, could 
cause resonance attack sensor and actuators 
that measures the temperatures of a particular 
environment (target) manipulate and cause 
the system to  to oscillate (vector) sending 
false data measurement to the control center 
or shut system down (impact) [9]. 
2.4.2 Advance Meter-Reading Infrastructure 
(AMI) Attack 
The CPS Smart grid uses smart meter appliances 
to provide electric power to organizations and 
households. The AMI is a device that provides 
advanced energy monitoring and recording, data 
collection, and load management capacities of 
consumers to the organization. The AMI is a 
two-way communication system that can reach 
every device in a distributions space [10]. For 
instance, the electric power company may use 
AMI for reading digital meters and has a 
diagnostics port and a wireless adaptor 
embedded on the digital devices that interact 
with the meter's data for billing and diagnostics. 
The AMI takes the various data readings and 
sends them to the control system.  
 An internal attacker could exploit the hard-
coded password that is used to authenticate 
users. Then manipulate the development 
tools that integrate with HEMS and CMS 
application software that interfaces with the 
wireless mobile devices.   
 A malware or DDoS attack can be initiated 
externally on the digital meter that is 
equipped with a diagnostics port and wireless 
interface meter readings.  
 
2.5 Vulnerabilities  
CPS Vulnerabilities are those spots on network 
nodes, link and the various endpoints on the 
infrastructures that could be exploited. These 
vulnerable spots are the firewalls, IEDs, IPs, 
HTTP headers, filters, Routers, network, 
Websites, password, and servers. Other 
vulnerabilities include inserting malware or 
spyware in software that is bought off the shelf.  
2.6 Cyber Physical System Risks  
The risk is the probability of an attack being 
initiated or something bad happening to the 
critical infrastructure. CPS risks include those 
threats that have the potential to cause harm to 
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the application processes, network, and physical 
infrastructures. We review works that 
considered assessing those risks as discussed in 
2.3. Nicol et al 2016, proposed a risk assessment 
of cyber access to physical infrastructures in 
CPSs [8]. Cardenas et al. 2011, analyzed 
security mechanisms applicability and 
challenges to CPS for deterring attacks [9]. 
Wand & Lu 2013, presented a survey of 
cybersecurity issues for smart grid and 
highlighted cyberattacks from substation 
control systems [11]. Similarly, Sun et al 2018, 
review cybersecurity testbeds for research that 
demonstrates cybersecurity risks [12]. 
However, Axelrod 2013, proposed a model that 
determines CPS risk across a broad range of 
public and private sectors organization. [21]. 
However, the authors did not factor in 
cybercrime risks on the application systems. 
2.7 Managing Cyber Physical System Risks  
Managing CPS risk is a challenging task for 
industry adoption due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the CPS smart grid. CPS risks of 
cybercrime attacks include process failure, 
component failure or application failure as 
discussed in 2.5. Humayed et al. 2015 proposed 
a unified framework that consists of three 
orthogonal coordinates [10]. Wan & Al 
Farugue. 2015, proposed a framework for the 
design of secure control systems for CPS [29]. 
Al Faruque et al. 2010, proposed a security-
aware model based on the design in methods to 
assess the security of CPS within four types of 
architecture level attacks [30]. Lewi 2002, 
reassess the risks of cyber threat on national 
critical infrastructures and highlights the set of 
issues that relate to cyber-terrorism and cyber-
attacks on critical infrastructures [27].  The 
author posits that the premise of cyber terrorism 
is that as national infrastructures become more 
dependent on computer networks for 
organizational requirements and operations so 
are new vulnerabilities. However, the emphasis 
placed on cybercrimes such as manipulation, 
alteration, APT and exfiltration is not addressed.  
 
2.8 Cybercrime Risk Controls and Standards 
Cybercrime risks in CPS are inevitable, 
however, with risk assessments, analysis, and 
reviews in place, it could be managed in the 
event of any threat. CPS risk could prove more 
damaging to organizations due to its integrated 
nature should something bad occur that could 
impact negatively on an organizational goal. For 
us to have a risk on these CPS in a given 
situation, we need to have both the probable 
threats and vulnerabilities that when exploited, 
and could cause major disruptions. Shoukry et 
al 2013, devised a robust output feedback 
controller that is resilient to attacking the 
scheduling of packets in a network control 
system. [32]. Similarly, Kayode et al 2014 [33], 
proposed a formal model for risk management 
in cybercrime control systems. The framework 
recommended three steps namely, Risk 
Assessment, Risk Mitigation, and Evaluation. 
However, the framework does not include 
evolving threats and vulnerabilities such as 
Advanced Persistent Threats (ATP). Leyden 
2017 [34], a proposed framework built on 
vulnerability disclosure, ISO/IEC29147-2014, 
to provide reports of security flaws consistent 
with what NCSC describe as an active cyber 
defense. Similarly, Gordon et al [35], proposed 
a three-step approach to cyber-incidence risk 
management framework to manage the risk 
arising from cyber incidents. However, the work 
did not include software vulnerabilities that can 
negate all the features proposed including 
resonance attacks and APTs that are evolving. 
NIST 2014 [36], proposed a cybersecurity 
framework that will provide collaboration 
between government and private sector to use 
common mechanisms to address and manage 
cybersecurity risks without placing additional 
regulatory needs on businesses. NIST 2017 [37], 
provides context on how an organization views 
cybersecurity risks and proposes four ties from 
Partial (Tier 1) to Adaptive (Tier 4) that align 
cybersecurity activities with its business 
requirements, risk tolerance, and controls. CIS 
Controls 2018 [38], provides a prioritized set of 
practices that mitigate attacks. ISO27005:2011 
[39], provides information security risks 
applicable to application systems. 
ISO31000:2009 [40], provide risk management 
principles and guidelines for varying needs of an 
organization.    
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2.9 Existing Gabs 
The related works revealed several gaps. In 
assessing risk, we observed that [8], [9], [11] 
analyzed security mechanism applicability and 
challenges to CPS, and did a survey of 
cybersecurity security requirements on the 
smart grid.  
 However, the authors did not consider 
cybercrime threats to CPS application 
systems.  
 Their works did not consider cybercrime 
risk from the integration of information and 
smart grid communication perspective.  
 Existing the studies focused on the 
cyberattacks, not the cybercrimes  
In managing CPS risks [10], [28], [29], [30], 
proposed different to managing risks. 
However, the work did not include: 
 Identifying emerging threats and 
vulnerabilities in software bought off the 
shelf and cybercrime attacks such as 
spyware and APTs attacks that are evolving. 
 The existing work did not consider attacks 
from SMEs, suppliers, and distributors who 
are more susceptible to cybercrimes. 
 Exiting works relied more on cybersecurity 
for CPS attacks and not on cybercrime. 
Based on our observations, our work seeks to 
assess cybercrime and risk from evolving 
organizational threat landscape using the 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP). The 
paper identified cybercrimes and risks that are 
associated with a smart grid business application 
system to determine the motives and intents of 
the cybercriminal. The contributions of this 
paper discussed in section 1, includes using 
AHP and subjective judgments to identify and 
assess risks for decision makings. The paper 
contributes to using AHP method to determine 
the net risk levels for cybersecurity strategic 
planning, resource selection, resource 
allocation, and policy formulations. The results 
show that using the AHP approach to identify 
cybercrime and risk on CPS, provides specific 
risk mitigation goals.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we adopt the AHP and semi-
quantitative approach for the methodology 
based on the art and observations. We use CPS 
cyber-attack vectors to determine the risk levels 
as impediments of the mitigation goals.  To 
determine their relative importance, we 
prioritize the goals using the Analytical 
Hierarchical Process (AHP) [14] [15]. The 
concept includes identifying tangible and 
intangibles assets and how much more one 
element dominates another in term of relative 
importance with respect to a given attribute. We 
quantify the attributes to be the cyber attack 
risks on the assets that need assessment to 
ensure the CPS are secure.  
3.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP uses pairwise comparisons and relies 
on expert judgement to derive priority scales 
[14].  We use the AHP method to derive 
pairwise comparisons for decision making in 
identifying cybercrime risks. We evaluate the 
relative importance of the goals in 3.3 using 
expert judgment and semi-quantitative approach 
to determine the net risk level. The reason for 
using the AHP approach to identifying 
cybercrime and risks on CPS is that:  
 AHP uses subjective judgements in 
decision makings. From an 
organizational perspective, AHP is used 
for cybersecurity strategic planning, 
resource, and budget allocation, audit 
purposes, policy formulations, and 
implementation. This may influence 
business value. 
 From an implementation point of view, 
the AHP approach provides a logical risk 
assessment framework to determine the 
benefits of each alternative. The 
pairwise comparison matrix provides us 
the ability to determine the preferences 
of each alternative over another, hence, 
the results for determining 
organizational requirements are reliable.  
 The reason for considering the 
mitigations goals is that cybercrimes 
threats are only identified after it has 
occurred. Organizations that intend to 
evolve their business on cyber supply 
chain platforms may use the AHP 
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approach as part of requirements 
capture.  
   
3.1.1 The Rationale for Using AHP Approach 
for Cybercrimes and Risks for CPS 
Most organizations integrate their systems with 
SMEs, suppliers, and distributors for business 
processes and service deliveries in the cyber 
supply chain environment [41] to achieve 
organizational goal. In CPS application 
developments, we look at people, process before 
the technology required to support the 
integration and processes. We believe using 
AHP and subjective judgements approach 
places more emphasis on people and processes 
to identify and assess risks for decision making 
and cybersecurity strategic planning. The 
rationales below are for assets, business, and 
socio-economic impact factors:  
 Impact on Assets: cybercrime risks on 
SMEs in terms of their business assets, 
finance, socio-economic, and insurances 
are high as they are most susceptible to 
cyber attacks leading to cybercrimes and 
cascading effects. Webber 2003, posits 
that SMEs are the heart of every 
economic growth as they make up the 
social fabric [42]. However, these 
businesses are mostly the victims of 
cybercrime as they fail to deploy 
security policies to manage cyber risks 
and are used as targets to CPS systems in 
a supply chain environment. SMEs [19] 
make up 99% of all businesses in the EU 
employing 86.8 million people, 
equivalent to 66% of the workforce.  
 Financial Impact: SMEs use 
inexperience IT personnel’s, hence are 
prone to threats and vulnerable to 
attacks. Anderson et al. 2012 [13], looks 
at the infrastructures supporting 
cybercrime and proposed a framework 
for analyzing the cost of cybercrime 
against defense cost, direct losses, and 
indirect losses. Capgemini 2012 [43], 
estimated the global cost of cybercrime 
to $388 billion with a direct cash cost of 
$114 billion including money stolen and 
spent on attack resolutions. However, a 
study in 2009 estimated the cost of 
stolen intellectual property and 
expenditures for fixing the damage from 
the data breach to be $1 trillion.  
 Economic Impact: According to 
Ponemon Institute, cybercrime has 
increased 22.6%, the average cost of 
cybercrime on 95% companies suffer 
64% experienced web-based attacks, 
44% experienced stolen or hijacked 
computing devices, and 42% on 
experience malicious codes attack.  UK 
spent £27 billion per year loss to the UK 
economy on cybercrime. Approximately 
80% or £21 million borne in companies. 
In Germany, the estimated cybercrime 
losses were 90 billion Euros in 2010. In 
a study conducted in five countries, 
Australia, France, Germany, UK and 
US, the cost per company arising from 
data breaches reached $4 million in 
2010, a rise of 18% from 2009. 
However, these estimations did not 
factor in developing countries such as 
Africa, looking at the global and 
evolving nature of cybercrimes.  
 Business Impact: WEF 2008, the report 
indicates that without adequate policies 
in place, the economic losses caused by 
cyber attackers could be up to $3000 
billion by 2020 [21]. The impact was 
evident in the 2017 WannaCry and Petya 
Ransomware attacks. WEF highlighted 
the need to address cybercrime risks by 
all stakeholders. Hence, we use AHP to 
evaluate cybercrime risks. 
 
3.2 Survey Context 
Based on the understanding of the CPS security 
issues, we used IT security experts from an 
organization that uses smart grid systems. The 
participants were IT Directors, CISOs, IT 
managers, systems administrators, and technical 
experts. Online questionnaires were considered 
as well as face to face interviews in the case. 
Considering the nature of the questionnaires and 
the sensitive nature of cybercrime the question 
was generic to provide us the basics of threats 
and vulnerabilities.  
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3.3 CPS Risk Mitigation Goals 
In this section, we compare the CPS risk 
mitigations goals qualitatively and 
quantitatively and follow the AHP approach to 
evaluate the relative importance. We compare 
the risk mitigation against these four goals: 
Business Value, Organizational Requirements, 
Threat Agent and Impact Vectors. 
 Business Value: This includes 
organizational assets, market value, 
customer base, collaborations, business 
partners, market stance, directions, and 
system infrastructures. 
 Organizational Requirements: Includes 
the activities and operational requirements 
needed for successful implementation of 
business objectives such as service delivery, 
policies, and procedures, service level 
agreements, roles, and responsibilities. 
 Threat Agent: This goal identifies all the 
nature of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
attacks. The threats include phishing, spear 
phishing, cross-site scripting attack, session 
high jacking attacks, and SQL injections.   
The vulnerabilities include the spots that the 
threat agent could exploit such as the web 
servers, firewalls, DMZ, and IDS/IPS. 
Attack vectors include malware, 
ransomware, spyware, Advanced Persistent 
Threat (ATP) and DoS attacks that could be 
initiated in the threat landscape. 
 Impact Vectors: This function considers all 
the probable consequences of the 
cyberattacks listed as the threat agents on the 
CPS. The impact includes loss of assets, 
revenue, reputation, expertise, customers, 
market stance and collapse of the business.  
3.4 Risk Assessment Method 
The study adopts a semi-quantitative risk 
assessment method to determine the risk level 
due to the invisibility nature of cybercrime.  
Using a complete quantitative method to 
determine the risk probability values will be 
challenging for risk management. The Semi-
quantitative risk assessment approach will assist 
in determining the relative importance of 
implementing the countermeasures to protect 
the CPS assets and the cost of alternatives. We 
calculate the net risk value expected based on 
the threat vectors of a particular attack on a 
system with the frequency of occurrence within 
a period to estimate the number of times a threat 
exploited would be successful on a 
vulnerability. Therefore, the risk assessment 
follows a semi-quantitative method to calculate 
the net risk values.    
4 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
RISK MITIGATION GOALS 
The study follows the AHP net risk mitigation 
calculation for the relative importance of the 
mitigation goals. [14], [15], based on an 
organizational context, each goal’s relative 
importance level is compared with other goals. 
We use the scales of the (1-9). Refer table 1.  (1) 
indicates extremely low risk in terms of the 
importance to a threat or an attack and (9) 
indicates extremely high risk in terms of its 
importance should a cyber-attack actually 
occurs on the CPS compared to another goal. 
Ones the importance levels of each goal is 
obtained compared to another, the Comparative 
Matrix (CM) levels are stabilized to determine 
the weight. The AHP method is used to calculate 
the ratio in the equation to confirm levels of 
consistencies. The weighted value should sum 
up to (1).  Where the ratio is 10, it shows 
inconsistent and the value must be redefined 
[15].  
Let:  
CR: Consistency Ratio 
CV: Consistency Vector 
RV: Random Consistency Vector 
CM: Comparison Matrix Value 
 
Risk Mitigation Goals 
 BV: Business Value 
 OR: Organization Requirements 
 TA: Threat Agent 
 IV: Impact Vectors 
 
4.1 Risk Mitigation Goals 
The relative importance of the net risk 
mitigation calculation depends on the business 
value in terms of assets, organizational 
requirements in relation to (user, systems and 
operational requirements), the assigned 
vulnerability that the treating agent could 
exploit and the impact vector.
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Table 1. Net Risk Relative Importance 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Relative Importance 
Levels  Probability  Explanations    ______________________ 
1  Extremely Low  Acceptable mitigation of two goals that contribute equally  
3  Low   Moderate mitigation or slightly in favor of a goal over the other 
5  Medium  Strong mitigation goal that favor one goal over the other  
7  High   Very strong mitigation goal that its dominance demonstrate 
     practice  
9  Extremely High  Extremely High Evidence of favoring one mitigation goal over the 
other is clear   
2, 4, 6, 8.         Variance  Intermediary values that determines oscillations between 
mitigations vectors 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2. Comparative Matrix 
_____________________________ 
Comparative Matrix Values___ 
BV OR TA IV 
BV 9 7 5 9 
OR 7 1 7 5 
CMi  TA 5 3 1 9 
IV 9 2 3 1 
 
 
(CR)=  
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼
     (1) 
 
Step 2: Net Risk Mitigation Calculations 
 
The net risk mitigation calculations depend on 
the related threat agents (TA). The threat agents 
are the causes of risks factors that we need to 
determine the threat probability level and impact 
to estimate the outcome. Refer to table 2. Due to 
the invincibility nature of cybercrimes we use 
subjective judgment and consider the rules 
below [9], to support our estimations: 
 Rule 1: Impact depends on the affected 
mitigation goal: were risk impacts 
mitigation goals such as business value 
and organization requirements, then the 
impact is deemed as high.  
 
 Rule 2: Where the risk is higher than 
what the organization expects, we 
consider the risk factor it as extremely 
high.  
 
 Rule 3: Subjective judgement is suitable 
for calculating the net risk as it assists in 
avoiding wrong estimations.  
 
4.2 Net Risk Results 
 
The net risk results has used the summation of 
the various levels of risk that impacts on the 
goals. We calculate the various level of risks and 
relative importance by risk mitigation goals. We 
apply the same approach to calculate the risk 
value, probability, and impact.  
 
Let,  
Ri: Value of Risk 
 
ri: Individual risk factor value 
 
ri1……riN: N influence risk factor of a risk Ri.  
 
P(ri): Probability of risk factor ri…. 
 
Probability scales = low/unlikely (less than 
0.30), medium/likely (0.30-0.49), high/critical 
risk (0.49--0.59), extremely/certainly high 
(above 0.60) 
 
I: Impact of overall risk Ri 
 
Impact scales = low(less than 0.30) medium 
(0.30--0.49) high (0.49--0.59) extremely high 
(above 0.60) 
 
Rnet: Net risk of Ri 
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Rw: Relative weight of the affected mitigation 
goal [BV, OR, TA, IV] by Ri. 
 
Risk level scales: low risk (less than 0.30), 
medium (0.30--0.49) critical risk (0.49--0.59), 
highly critical risks (above 0.60) 
 
ri=P(ri) x I  
 (2) 
 
Ri= 
1
𝑁
 ∑{ri1, ri2, ri3…….,rin}  
 .(3) 
 
Rnet = ∑ Rw x Ri             (4) 
 
 
4.3 Determining Risk Levels 
 
Determining risk levels using AHP methods 
requires a tradeoff between the mitigation goals. 
Saaty [14], posits that in using AHP, decisions 
involve many intangibles and tangibles that 
need to trade off. To achieve that, we measured 
the decisions alongside tangibles and evaluated 
the measurements to determine how well they 
serve the objectives of the decision. We adopt 
the pairwise comparisons method to determine 
which risk level has a greater risk impact and 
requires mitigation. We determine risk level 
using table 1 as follows:    
 Low risk of (less than 0.30) TA has minimal 
impact on BV: Implement security strategy 
to mitigate the risk such as formulation 
Policies, educating users, regular updates 
and constant monitoring of the threat.   
 Medium risk (between 0.30-0.49) TA is 
considered moderate and needs constant 
monitoring and as it may never happen such 
a Zero-day attack, but when it does the 
consequences may cost system failure and 
financial impact. 
 High risk (between 0.49-0.59) OR process 
needs to be evaluated to mitigate TA: 
Indicates has a high impact factor and effect 
on the CPS and requires security reviews to 
mitigate the risk. Developed a plan for the 
execution of the control measures within a 
specific period.  Implement controls to 
counter such cyber-attacks as DoS Attack, 
APT, spoofing, evil-maid attack. The risk 
management process includes having 
countermeasures in places such as regular 
backups, regular updates, insurance, training 
and awareness workshops and adoption of 
cloud services.  
 Extremely High risk (above 0.60) TA 
could impact on BV with high impact factor 
on IV and implies that identified control 
measures on the CPS for the risks are 
required to be implemented immediately 
with a contingency plan. This could cause 
financial loss, economic, trust and 
reputation damage to the organization. The 
countermeasures are required for such 
attacks resonance attacks, ransomware 
attack and malware attack that may sabotage 
the systems.  
 
  
 
Figure 2. Relative Importance of Risk 
Mitigation Goals 
 
 
5 IMPLEMENTATION  
In this section, we use a case study to evaluate 
the likelihood of cybercrime risks on the smart 
grid. The goal is to determine the level of risk 
associated with each of the mitigation goals in 
the event of a cybercrime.  
 
5.1 AHP Participants 
Based on the understanding of the CPS security 
issues, we used IT security experts from an 
organization that uses smart grid systems. The 
participants were IT Directors, ISOs, IT 
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managers, systems administrators, and technical 
experts.  
5.2 Case Study Context 
An electric power distribution network 
communication system uses mesh topologies and 
SCADA systems as the main infrastructures that 
support the CPS smart grid system. The 
organization uses Customer Management 
Systems (CMS) the application system that 
integrates the core business objectives. The 
systems include customer data records, billing 
systems and bill payment transactions to 
electronic transaction systems, and banking 
services.  
The organization found out that an intruder has 
penetrated the network server remotely through 
the public facing IP service that is used for the 
prepaid and post-paid service network system.  
The organization also outsources its sensitive 
customer data, financial information, business 
strategy, and organizational structures to third 
party companies, data centers and vendors for 
storage, processing, analysis and aggregation for 
business decisions.  
5.3 Asset Identification  
Assets identification is the process of 
documenting all the critical infrastructures of 
the CPS. Organizational assets are the staff, 
data, servers, infrastructures that when put 
together could be used to achieve an 
organizational goal or the business value. These 
assets are tangible and intangible assets that 
could be affected and various cybercrimes that 
can be committed. In the risk management 
process, asset identification is critical in 
carrying out risk identification and assessment.
Table 3. Identification of Assets, Vulnerable 
Spots, and Cybercrimes 
Assets Vulnerable 
Spots 
Cybercrimes 
Smart Grid Network/ Firewall DDoS, 
Resonance 
Network 
System 
Sub Station / IPs / 
Firewall 
RAT, 
Firewalls 
CMS Password/Remote 
Penetration 
ID Theft, 
Data Theft 
Servers Web Server/Mail 
Server 
Spear Phishing 
/ IP Spoofing 
AMI/Handheld 
Devices 
IP Address Data 
Manipulation/ 
Redirect 
Scripts 
HEMS Password Alter Billing 
Systems 
SCADA/RTU Network/Server Rootkit / 
Botnet 
Prepaid 
Systems 
Website/IP 
Address 
RAT, Session 
Hijacking 
 
 
5.4 Threat Identification 
Threats are those cyber attacks that have the 
potential to cause harm to the CPS application 
systems. We identify those threats as malware, 
spyware and ransomware attacks that could 
cause security effects as confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, accountability, and non-
repudiation to the business value. Threat 
identification assists in risk categorization, risk 
analysis to determine the likelihood and impact, 
and for monitoring and control.  
 
5.5 Results  
Figure 3 below, depicts the relative importance 
of risk mitigation goals from the weighted value 
of the scenario. The prioritized risk is the 
business value with a weighted value of 70% as 
it determines the organizational goal and the 
needed to secure it is critical. Organizational 
requirements have a weighted value of 55% as 
it determines the organizational business 
processes including the user, system and 
operational policies required to ensure business 
values are achieved. Threat agent has a weighted 
value of 45% and it is used to in ensuring 
business continuity. Failure to identify those 
threats agents in line with the organizational 
requirements could cause threats such as 
malware, spyware and ransomware attacks. The 
impact value has a weighted value of 60% as the 
impact could cause security effects such as 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
accountability and repudiation issues to the 
business value.  
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 Figure 3. Results of the relative importance 
of risk mitigation goals from Scenario 
5.6 Comparisons of the Results 
This section summaries the findings of both the 
state of the art and the results. Most of the 
literature justify the need for a considering 
cybercrime and risk for CPS. Our results and 
scenario identified the risks and critical areas as 
well as the related mitigating goals. The results 
of the case studies and risk mitigation goals 
indicate that the relative importance of the 
mitigation goal is subjective to the 
organizational assets and the associated risk as 
listed in table 3. Moreover, mitigating factors 
such as standards and legislative frameworks 
also affect mitigation goals. Participants agreed 
that penetration testing, auditing, regular 
updates, and segmentation are key requirements 
to prevent and reduce downtime in the event of 
cybercrime attacks.  
 .Business Value: The results reveal that 
risks on the BV are extremely high as any 
cybercrime on the organizational assets, 
could impact on finance, trust, 
collaborations, business partners and the 
smart grid system infrastructures. To 
mitigate cybercrimes, the organization must 
ensure that it uses the deep packet inspection 
firewalls that is able to detect attacks from 
all the suppliers, third party vendors, and 
SMEs. The IEDs becomes vulnerable when 
the firewall is not able to detect and prevent 
intrusions and can lead to attacks such as 
DDoS and Resonance attacks that causes 
oscillation to the power supply and utility 
readings.   
 Organizational Requirements: The results 
show that descriptions of the processes and 
constraints that are generated during the 
requirements engineering phase form the 
basis for the system developments. These 
processes and constraints are statements that 
support the user requirements and system 
requirements used to achieve the 
organizational goal. The use of activities and 
operational requirements are needed to 
identify risk factors that can affect business 
objectives. The user requirements capture 
operational constraints, the system 
requirements set out the detailed functional 
and service constraints about what the 
customer requires from a system and the 
constraints under which it operates.  This 
details will be used for risk assessments to 
manage risk, implement policies and 
procedures, service level agreements, roles, 
and responsibilities.  
 Threat Agent: The risk to confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of organizational 
assets is as the result of the combination of 
the threat agent, the vulnerabilities that the 
threat agent could exploit and the impact on 
the smart grid. To identify the mitigating 
factors, the goals that identify all the nature 
of threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks as 
listed in.4.1.  
 Impact Vectors: the probable 
consequences of the cybercrimes are 
determined by the likelihood of the threat 
and the level of impact. The impact of 
cybercrime on the organization will cause 
loss of assets such as intellectual property, 
revenue loss as a result of meter tampering, 
reputation damage through distrust, loss of 
customer confidence.  
Controls must be established to mitigate the 
cybercrimes. Although this paper did not focus 
on CPS risk management, we recommend 
standard that we may adopt to assist in 
preventing network intrusions that could lead to 
cybercrimes. The organization must carry out 
penetration testing on the distributed network, 
subnets and substations communication 
networks to identify all the vulnerable spots on 
a regular basis especially on the public facing IP 
addresses. There are organizations that provide 
0
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risk management and controls such as NIST 
Critical Infrastructure Framework, ISO 27002 
ISMS, ISO 31000 Risk Management, IEC 
61850.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Cybercrime and risks on CPS are on the increase 
and its impact on business processes are 
unquantifiable. There are many challenges 
facing organizations in their quest to mitigate 
cybercrime risks. The paper identified 
cybercrimes, and threats that the attacker could 
deploy and the vulnerable spots to exploit on the 
smart grid application system in an 
organizational business process environment. 
Due to the invincibility of cyber attacks, and the 
complex integration of CPS, identifying the 
potential sources that a perpetrator can exploit 
provides an understanding of the threat, 
motives, and intents of the cyber attacker in 
mitigating risks. Cybercrime risks in CPS are 
inevitable, however, with risk assessments, 
analysis, and reviews in place, it could be 
managed in the event of any threat. Using the 
AHP method, subjective judgment, expert 
opinion and semi-quantitative methods to 
identify the vulnerable spots, target, motive, 
attack vectors, and potential consequences assist 
in assessing cybercrime risks. An organizational 
goal determines the type of risk mitigation 
goals. We used BV, OR, TA, and IV to 
determine the results. The prioritize risks and 
the threat levels assist in cybersecurity strategic 
planning, resource selection, budget allocation, 
and policy formulations. The results were 
determined by the relative importance of the risk 
mitigation goals. The results revealed that CPS 
attacks are imminent and require further studies 
that look at the evolving nature of cyber crimes. 
Therefore, to mitigate CPS risks, it is important 
to provide a risk management framework that is 
able to support specific organizational goal and 
objectives. Further research is required to 
determine the relative importance of CPS risk 
management considering the changing 
cybercrime threat landscapes.     
6.1 Future work  
The paper focused on cybercrime and risks on 
CPS and discussed security threats, attacks 
risks, and vulnerabilities. Future works will look 
at CPS smart grid attacks, machine learning, and 
decision trees in cybersecurity and a 
comprehensive risk management approach to 
CPS. 
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